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U.S. Investment in the 1980s:
The Real Story
CENTRAL proposition of conventional
analyses of fiscal policy in this decade has been
that unprecedented federal budget deficits have
crowded out domestic investment, especially
business investment. In this view, the Reagan
administration did not achieve one of its central
goals: to raise investment, productivity and
growth. Instead, investment has been seriously
eroded, and the burgeoning foreign claims on
this nation’s future income will confront a
smaller capacity to generate that income than
would otherwise have occurred. Professor Ben-
jamin Friedman sums up this view of recent
fiscal policy, arguing that it violates “the basic
moral principle that had bound each generation
of Americans to the next since the founding of
the republic: that men and women should work
and eat, earn and spend, both privately and col-
lectively, so that their children and their chil-
dren’s children would inherit a better world.’2
An opposing view of fiscal policy argues that
business investment was boosted substantially
by the incentives adopted early in this decade.
In this view, the rise in both interest rates and
the value of the dollar in the early 1980s were
reflections of the unusual strength of U.S. in-
vestment and the associated reallocation of
world capital stocks and income toward the
United States.2
This article provides a critical perspective on
the conventional view of domestic investment in
this decade. Although there are measures of in-
vestment that suggest that it was depressed, this
article will show that these measures have cru-
cial limitations. A closer inspection will show
that domestic investment and capital formation
have been relatively strong, especially from
1980 to 1985.
INVESTMENT AND SAVING IN
THE NATIONAL INCOME
ACCOUNTS
Understanding the relationships among domes-
tic investment, the government’s budget position
1Benjamin Friedman (1988), p. 4. Some of the other
popular proponents of the conventional view include
Business Week (1987) and (1988), Cooper (1986), Frankel
(1986), Beniamin Friedman (1986), Jonas (1986). Kennedy
(1987), Modigliani (1988), Peterson (1987) and Summers
(1987).
2See Milton Friedman (1988), Reynolds (1989), Poole
(1988), Tatom (1985), (1988) and Sinn (1988). The link be-
tween the reallocation of U.S. investment abroad to
domestic investment, the nominal supply of dollars for in-
ternational transactions and movements in the exchange
value of the dollar are detailed more fully in Tatom (1986)
and (1987a).
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and the nation’s foreign transactions can be
facilitated by considering some national income
and product account (NIPA) identities. Invest-
ment refers to purchases of durable goods that
are used to produce future goods and services,
such as business plant, equipment and inven-
tory purchases and new housing. The accumula-
tion of such real assets through investment has
to be financed and the source of such financing
is saving, the portion of income that is not
spent on current consumption.~
In the NIPA, one way to measure gross na-
tional product or the nation’s gross income is to
add up expenditures or purchases of final goods
and services. The principal types of such pur-
chases of domestic products are personal con-
sumption and housing purchases by households,
purchases by businesses, government (G) or ex-
port sales to foreigners (X). Business purchases
include investment in plant, equipment and in-
ventory changes; business investment spending
and residential investment comprise gross pri-
vate domestic investment (I). Another way of
measuring income is to add up the components
of income according to what households do
with it: pay taxes (T), save (5), or spend on con-
sumption of domestic product or foreign im-
ports (M).
Since consumer purchases appear in both ex-
penditures and income, they cancel each other
out when these two approaches are compared;
the remaining components of purchases (I + G
+ X), by definition, must equal the remaining
uses of income (T + S + M). Such an identity is
written as:
(1) 1 + G + X T + S + M.
‘i’his identity can be rewritten in a couple of
useful ways. The first way focuses on the gov-
ernment budget and trade deficits and the gap
between domestic saving and investment. ‘rhe
budget deficit (BD) is the excess of government
spending over receipts, which equals (G-i’)
above.~The trade deficit (TI]) is the excess of
imports of goods and services over exports, or
(M-X) above. The identity can be rearranged by
subtracting T, X, and I from both sides, and
substituting the definitions of the deficits to
obtain
(2) BD E TU + (S-I).
This identity shows the relationships of three
gaps: the government budget deficit, the trade
deficit and the gap between private domestic
saving and investment. A government budget
deficit must be financed by an excess of private
domestic saving over investment or by a trade
deficit.
The nation’s trade deficit represents a net
credit flow from foreigners, or asset accumula-
tion by foreigners in the form of loans or eq-
uity holdings in the United States. The trade
surplus is called “net foreign investment” by the
United States in the NIPA accounts. When it is
negative, it represents an inflow into the United
States, so the trade deficit can be called “net
foreign saving” (NFS).5
By rearranging identity 2, we can obtain an
identity of saving and investment, which shows
that saving used to finance private domestic
investment can come from private domestic
sources (5), the government sector (government
saving, or -BD) or foreign savers (NFS). Viewed
this way, the identity emphasizes that changes
in investment must reflect similar changes in
saving. Movements in the budget deficit or
domestic investment relative to domestic saving
have counterparts in the trade deficit.
THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF
INVESTMENT IN THE 1980s:
AN EMPHASIS ON CROWDING
OUT
A rise in the budget deficit (LID) due to in-
creased spending or decreased taxes must
change the right-hand side of identity 2 by an
~Purchases of consumer durable goods (like automobiles,
furniture and appliances) also involve investment and sav-
ing, but in the NIPA account such purchases are treated
as consumption. Reynolds (1989) includes such purchases
in investment and argues that U.S. investment was
unusually strong in the early 1980s. Like his findings, the
results below would be reinforced if the unconsumed
share of consumer durable purchases were included in in-
vestment and saving.
~Onlypurchases are included in G, but T is measured net
of transfer payments. Thus, the difference, (G-T),
measures the excess of government spending over
receipts, or the budget deficit.
6When the United States has a trade deficit and,
simultaneously, the rest of the world has a balanced
government budget, then the rest of the world must be
saving more than its domestic investment, and this excess
foreign saving equals the NFS of the United States.
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equal amount. The financing of the deficit re-
quires either increased domestic saving, 5, re-
duced domestic investment, I, or increased
foreign saving (which means a larger trade defi-
cit, TI]). Generally, the budget deficit must
“crowd out” spending elsewhere by reducing ex-
ports (TI] must rise), domestic consumption
spending (S must rise) or domestic investment (I
must fall). The conventional view emphasizes
the crowding out of domestic investment.
Developments in the 1980s, however, indicate
that the foreign sector cannot be ignored. The
trade deficit has risen sharply in the 1980s, re-
ducing the downward pressure on investment
expected in the conventional analysis. To main-
tain and service this rise in net borrowing from
abroad, a future flow of U.S. income has been
promised to foreign savers. Thus, a budget defi-
cit mortgages the future U.S. standard of living
either by reducing the capital stock and future
income or by reducing the amount of future
output that can be consumed domestically, or
both.
A SUPPLY—SIDE VIEW: TAX
INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT
The alternative view does not focus on the
budget deficit as either the principal influence
on investment or the most significant macroeco-
nomic change in the 1980s. It focuses instead
on tax changes early in the decade that in-
creased investment incentives and investment,
especially its business component. The supply-
side view argues that such tax law changes
raise the optimal capital stock, temporarily rais-
ing investment, despite any indirect effects that
these tax incentives may have on the budget
deficit or interest rates.°
Actions like those adopted in the early 1980s
that provide generous new tax credits for in-
vestment or accelerate depreciation will hasten
the replacement of obsolete plant and equip-
ment and make possible the purchase of new
facilities that otherwise might not have been
considered. Moreover, as investment demand
rises, the demand for funds to finance it in-
creases as well. Firms compete with each other
to attract investment financing by bidding up
returns on both equity and debt instruments.
The cost of capital to firms, including market
interest rates, rises as firms expand investment,
but by less than the value of the new invest-
ment incentives; net of these tax benefits, the
cost of capital falls. The net cost of capital rises
for firms that do not have access to these incen-
tives, however, including foreign firms opera-
ting abroad, Thus, these changes in market
rates of return and the cost of capital result in
a reallocation of capital and production among
nations, expanding domestic investment in the
United States and lowering it abroad.7
Similarly, when such investment incentives
are reduced, the optimal domestic capital stock
declines and the movements in investment, both
domestically and abroad, are reversed. To the
extent that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 re-
versed the earlier incentives, the optimal capital
stock and the pace of domestic investment
declined, despite any positive effects arising
from movements in the budget deficit and in-
terest rates.8
THE GOVERNMENT DEFICIT,
SAVING AND INVESTMENT: THE
RECORD
Figure 1 shows the total government deficit
and net foreign saving measured as shares of
nominal GNP.9 These measures correspond to
two of the gaps in identity 2 above, measured
as shares of nominal GNP. As the figure shows,
budget deficits, especially the federal deficit, are
strongly cyclical; the share of tax receipts tends
to fall while the share of spending, especially
unemployment compensation, rises during the
shaded recession periods. Similarly, cyclical in-
6There are a variety of arguments that suggest that deficits
do not affect investment via the conventional mechanism,
but they are not the central issue in the investment
debate, Tatom (1985) discusses the effects of budget
deficits on economic activity. In addition, it is arguable
whether tax law changes in the early 1980s raised the
observed budget deficit; instead, these changes mainly off-
set other tax increases, See Tatom (1984) and Meyer
(1983).
fl’atom (1986), (1987a), shows that movements in the value
of the dollar were associated with changes in the U.S.
supply of dollars for international asset purchases conse-
quent to changes in investment incentives.
°U.S.investment abroad would also be expected to rise, as
in fact, it did, See Tatom (1987a).
9State and local governments have run budget surpluses in
the 1970s and 1980s, so the total government deficit share
has been smaller than that of the federal government
since 1970. Before 1970, state and local government
budgets were more nearly in balance, so there is little dif-
ference in the two deficit shares before then.
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Figure 1
Government Budget Deficit and Foreign Saving
as Shares of GNP
creases in income and reductions in unemploy-
ment raise the share of tax receipts, while re-
ducing the government spending share some-
what. Thus, periods of business recession coin-
cide with periods of relatively large deficits.
Net foreign saving has been quite small histor-
ically and, until this decade, was generally nega-
tive; that is, on average, U.S. residents were net
investors abroad. Also, such foreign saving did
not exhibit much variation until the 1980s. As
figure 1 indicates, the recent rise in the govern-
ment deficit was matched, in part, by a rise in
the U.S. trade deficit or net foreign saving.’°
Figure 2 summarizes the net relationship of
the government budget deficit and trade deficit
to total domestic investment and the composi-
tion of its financing. The total of government
and foreign saving is shown in the figure, along
with private saving and gross private domestic
investment; all three are measured as shares of
nominal GNP. The rise in the government bud-
get deficit in the early 1980s and its subsequent
reduction dominate the movement in the total
of government and foreign saving; this ratio
falls sharply in 1981-82 and then recovers
somewhat. This total share rises quite sharply
in 1986-88, as tax increases associated with
federal tax reform, especially on income from
capital, reduced the budget deficit and reduced
U.S. investment incentives; the reduction in the
budget deficit exceeded the associated reduction
in net foreign saving. The private saving rate,
which often moves inversely with the budget
deficit share, is unusually high in the early
1980s, but falls beginning in 1985 and reaches
‘°Oneof the simple confusions that arises from NIPA ter-
minology is that the net foreign saving rise was actually
associated with a reduction in U.S. investment abroad, not
a rise in foreign investment in the United States. This ac-
counts for the movements in the flow and value of the
dollar in international exchange. Moreover, it means that
the rise in foreign saving was really a reallocation of U.S.
investment spending from foreign to domestic uses. See
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Figure 2




about 15 percent, near the lowest level shown,
in 1987.88.21
The share of gross private domestic invest-
ment is also strongly cyclical: housing purchases
and new plant, equipment, and inventory pur-
chases fall relatively more than income when
sales are falling and unemployment is rising.
Similarly, as sales growth and employment ex-
pand cyclically, such investment purchases rise
faster than income. The 1980 and 1981-82
declines in the investment share are associated
with recessions. At its peaks in 1980-81 and
1984, the share of gross private domestic invest-
ment in GNP exceeded 17 percent. This propor-
tion compares favorably with those at earlier
peaks in 1948, 1955-56 and 1972-73, but was ex-
ceeded from 1977 to 1979 and in the 1950
cyclical recovery. Gross private domestic in-
vestment generally does not exhibit unusual
strength as a share of GNP in the 1980s when
compared with its earlier performance; more-
over, like the private saving rate, it falls off
from 1985 to 1988, although not to historically
record lows.12
11An explanation for this relationship is provided in Barro
(1974), Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985) and Tatom
(1985), among others,
12Modigliani (1988) takes another approach to the effects of
the budget deficit. He credits administration policies with
substantially raising the growth of real personal disposable
income per capita (and consumption), but argues that this
is transitory or illusory because it arose from unsustainably
low taxes or high national borrowing. In fact, however,
from 1980 to 1987, personal disposable income rose 67.3
percent, essentially the same as the 66.9 percent rise in
national income. Moreover, the tax wedge in their dif-
ference rose 71.9 percent, so that taxes actually depress-
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Figure 3
Relative Price of Total and Business Fixed Investment Goods
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‘Total” is based on the implicit price deflators for gross private domestic investment and GNP. “Business’ is based
on the deflators for nonresidential fixed investment and GNP.
Other factors besides the business cycle in-
fluence investment, and these could account for
the apparent lackluster recent performance of
the investment share shown in figure 2. Major
changes in business taxes or other costs
associated with housing, plant, equipment or in-
ventory will influence investment. For example,
when business investment tax credits were sus-
pended in 1966-67 and 1969-71, sharp declines
in the investment share followed. Similarly, the
1986 decline was related, in part, to the end of
the investment tax credit in 1986. Another key
factor has been the cost of operating plant,
housing, and especially equipment. In 1974 and
1979, oil prices doubled, substantially raising
the cost of operating plant and equipment. Not
surprisingly, investment fell sharply relative to
GNP both times.”
RELATIVE PRICES AND REAL
INVESTMENT
Another factor that influences the investment
share is the relative price of investment goods.
Total spending on investment or other goods in-
“Energy-related investment is positively related to unex-
pected changes in the relative price of oil and energy.
Thus, the decline in investment in 1986 could be attributed
to a decline in such prices. When investment in petroleum
and natural gas exploration shafts and wells, mining and
oil field machinery, and public utility gas and petroleum
pipelines are excluded from the investment share, the pat-
tern shown in figure 2 and in figures 4 and 5 below re-
mains the same, This is not surprising since the dominant
effect on aggregate investment is typically the opposite to
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Figure 4
Nominal and Real Gross Private Domestic Investment
as Shares of GNP
cludes both a price and a quantity component;
similarly, the investment share is the product of
the relative price of investment goods and the
quantity of such goods relative to real GNP.
Gross private domestic investment equals the
price (P1) times the quantity or real investment,
R; similarly, the index for the price of the na-
tion’s output (P) times the measure of the quan-
tity of GNP, called real GNP (X), equals nominal
GNP. Thus, the share of nominal investment is
(P1R/PX) or the product of the relative price
(P1/P) and the real share of investment (R/X). As
a result, the movements in the nominal share in
figure 2 are only representative of real invest-
ment activity when the relative price of such
goods is unchanged or changes little.
The relative price of investment goods has
fallen sharply in the 1980s, however. As figure
3 shows, the relative price of all investment
goods declined about 15 percent from 1980 to
1988; for business plant and equipment, the
decline was about 17 percent. Prices generally
rose 41 percent over the period according to
the GNP deflator, but the deflator for gross
private domestic investment goods rose only
about 23 percent and that for business fixed in-
vestment rose only about 18 percent.14 When
the relative price falls, the share of spending
declines proportionately unless the real share of
spending increases. Since the nominal share of
investment did not plummet in the 1980s, the
real share of investment must have risen.
The Share of Real Investment
Rose in the I980a -
Figure 4 shows the nominal and real share of
investment in nominal GNP and real GNP, re-
14The unusual decline in the relative price of investment
goods could arise because of measurement errors. Such a
suspicion recently has arisen for computer equipment, for
example. Declining computer prices have produced an
unusually large decrease for the nonelectric equipment in-
dustry, but other equipment producers, like electric equip-
ment and transportation equipment, also show unusual
decreases in their relative price. See Tatom (1988).
The reason for the decline in the price of investment
goods is beyond the scope of this article, but the decline
is relatively greater for internationally-traded goods like
equipment than it is for structures. It is most easily tied to
an unusual rise in productivity in the U.S. traded goods
sector (see Tatom 1988) and to a sharp decline in the
growth of world trade. The latter was associated, at least




spectively, The performance of the real share
indicates that investment in the t980s was un-
usually strong and that it was associated with
the unusual decline in the relative price of in-
vestment goods. Indeed, there have been few
periods when real investment was as large a
share of real GNP as it was in 1984-88. In these
earlier periods, however, the unemployment
rate was substantially lower than recently and
measures of capacity utilization were much
higher. Adjusted for this cyclical difference, the
real investment share in the 1980s was un-
precedented in the post-World War II era.’5
Especially for Business Plant
and Equipment
The controversy over investment’s strength
typically focuses on business fixed investment,
not total investment. Movements in inventory or
residential fixed investment could account for
the favorable conclusion from figure 4. Figure 5
shows the share of real nonresidential fixed in-
vestment in real GNP and its cyclically-adjusted
counterpart.’° The case for relatively strong in-
vestment is even stronger in figure 5. Despite
the energy price and recession-induced declines
in the share, the 1986-87 tax-reform-related
decline, and the generally poorer cyclical per-
formance of the economy in the 1980s, the real
business fixed investment share has been quite
strong relative to its history.” At its lowest level
in 1982, it was generally as high as it had been
at most previous business cycle peaks.
‘5The share of real gross private domestic investment in real
CNP was 19.6 percent in 1929; from 1930 to 1948, it was
usually in single digits, but it exceeded 15 percent in 1930
(15.2 percent), 1941 (15.3 percent), and in 1946-48 (16.2
percent, 16.7 percent, 18.8 percent, respectively). In 1984,
the share equaled that in 1948, the second highest level in
60 years. In 1929 and 1948, however, cyclical factors
strongly boosted investment; unemployment was 3.2 per-
cent of the civilian labor force in 1929 and 3.8 percent in
1948. In 1984 and 1985, the unemployment rate exceeded
7 percent.
Real business fixed investment in real GNP was 13.1
percent in 1929 and 12 percent in 1930. The share did not
reach a double-digit level again until 1947-48 when it was
about 11.5 percent. This pace was not exceeded until
1978, when it reached 11.6 percent. The 1978 share has
been equaled or exceeded each year since then, except in
1983 when the share was 11 percent. The 1985 share of
12.5 percent was the modern peak.
‘6The cyclically adjusted share is based on a regression of
changes in the logarithm of the actual share on current
and four significant past changes in the logarithm of the
manufacturing capacity utilization rate for the period
111/1949 to 111/1988. This regression has an adjusted R2 of
0.39, a standard error of 7.76 percent, and a Durbin-
Watson statistic of 1.89. The regression indicates that a 1
percent rise in the utilization rate raises the share of such
The cyclically-adjusted share indicates the re-
cent strength quite clearly. This share surged to
record levels when the 1981 tax act was passed
in the third quarter of 1981 and remained there
until tax reform began to reduce business in-
vestment incentives in the first quarter of 1986.
This share has rebounded somewhat since its
trough in the first quarter of 1987.
THE GROSS VS, NET INVESTMENT
CONTROVERSY
One counter argument to the strength of
domestic investment or its business component
is that such spending has been boosted by an
accelerated pace of obsolescence. The increased
obsolescence is associated with an increasingly
shorter-lived capital stock that is of lower quali-
ty. According to this argument, after subtrac-
tins depreciation, new investment has been
depressed compared with its past performance.’~
Figure 6 shows net nonresidential fixed invest-
ment as a share of GNP using both nominal and
real measures. Again, relative price movements
affect performance in this decade, but, either
way, the net investment share appears relatively
weak. Compared with a recent peak of about 4
percent in 1979, net investment declines to
about 3½ percent in 1980-81, and then plum-
mets. Except for a temporary recovery in
1984-85, the shares have been generally lower
in this decade. In particular, net investment fell
investment by 0.9 percent. The adjusted share is com-
puted on the basis of an 82 percent utilization rate, about
the postwar average.
liThe decline in the price of investment goods relative to the
GNP deflator or, what is nearly the same, the price
deflator for consumption goods and services, has the
same implication for nominal saving rates as for invest-
ment rates. When the price of goods yielding future con-
sumption services falls relative to current goods and ser-
vices, a given saving rate out of nominal income implies a
proportionately larger real saving rate. Thus, a given flow
of future consumption can be obtained with a propor-
tionately smaller share of saving in nominal GNP. Since
the private saving rate (figure 2) did not decline as sharp-
ly, as the relative price ofinvestment goods, the effective
saving rate was relatively high, especially in 1982-85.
laThe methods of estimating discard and obsolescence rates
used in the national income and product accounts have
not been altered since they were introduced in the late
1940s. Many analysts prefer the use of the unadjusted
gross data because of the uncertain accuracy of deprecia-
tion data. See Denison (1979), for example. The Council of
Economic Advisers (1989) discuss this distinction, pointing
out the advantages of the gross measure.
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Figure 5
Real Business Fixed Investment as a Share of GNP
Percent
to nearly its lowest recorded level following the
tax reform act of 1986. Thus, the figure sug-
gests that net investment was indeed quite
weak in the 1980s, especially when nominal
measures are used. The apparent weakness in
the measures, however, is subject to the same
qualifications as gross investment: the real
measures are not as low and, adjusted for
cyclical differences, the real net investment
share was not depressed in the 1980s.1~More-
over, there are other reasons to doubt the valid-
ity of the apparent weakness of net investment.
Did the capital stock become markedly
shorter-lived in the 1980s, raising the rate of
obsolescence of the given stock of business
plant and equipment? One indicator of the
changing age of the capital stock is the mix of
plant and equipment; equipment normally has a
much shorter expected service life than struc-
tures do. The top panel of figure 7 shows a
noteworthy shift in the mix of investment from
1980 to 1985. It was not a swing toward equip-
ment, however. Instead, following the sharp up-
ward trend that raised the share of equipment
in total business fixed investment from about 51
percent in 1961 to 67 percent in 1978, the
share declined, especially in 1981-82, then rose,
but did not reach 67 percent again until 1985.
Tax reform reduced the incentive to invest in
structures relatively more than it did to pur-
chase equipment. Thus, the equipment share
surged to record highs in 1986-87. TIle bottom
panel of figure 7 shows the depreciation rate
‘°Thehigher peaks of the net investment ratio in 1956-57,
1966, 1969, 1973 and 1979 than in 1981 and 1984-85 are
due to cyclical differences noted above. The average
manufacturing capacity utilization rate in those earlier
years was 86.5 percent, significantly higher than the 79.6
percent average in 1981 and 1984-85. When adjustments
like those in footnote IS are applied to quarterly data
prepared by this Bank, the average real net business fixed
investment share was sharply higher in these three years
than the average for the six previous peak years listed
above.
Percent
1951 54 57 50 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 1987
1Based on a manufacturing capacity utilization rate of 82 percent.
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for the net stock of private nonresidential
capital. This rate rose from about 9 percent of
the net capital stock in 1980 to about 9.7 per-
cent in 1984 and 1987. This rise reflects the
pre-1980 increase in the share of shorter-lived
equipment in total investment.
The rise in the depreciation rate suggests that
the increase in the share of real gross invest-
ment overstates the strength of capital forma-
tion.20 But net investment, independent of other
measurement problems, understates capital for-
mation. When scrapped old equipment is replac-
ed by new equipment of equal market value, no
net investment occurs. Nevertheless, the newer
vintage plant or equipment embodies a newer
technology and is more productive than the
older, discarded plant or equipment, so that
output rises despite the absence of net
investment.
CAPITAL PER WORKER AND
PRODUCTIVITY
The performance of net investment in figure
6 is misleading for another reason. Gross and
net investment are measures of changes in
20Direct estimates show that the average age of the net
nonresidential stock of capital (1982 prices) has not fallen.
The U.S. Department of Commerce (1987) estimates that
the average age generally rose slightly from 1969 to 1981
and that it has been higher in this decade than in the
1970s, on average. The gross stock, a measure that
removes depreciated capital from the stock estimates only
as it is discarded or removed from service, has a declining
average age in the 1970s, reaching its lowest level in
1981. Its age subsequently rose and has exceeded its
1979 age every year since 1981, and generally by growing
amounts.
Figure 6
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Figure 7
Share of Equipment in Real Business Fixed Investment and
Depreciation Rate for the Real Net Nonresidential
Capital Stock
Percent 75
capital goods, but the purpose of investment is
to affect the total plant and equipment available.
Moreover, it is the total quantity of capital per
worker that influences output per unit of labor,
or productivity, and the standard of living, not
the share of new investment goods in output.
Growth in the stock of capital per worker is ex-
pected to alter the way people work and raise
productivity, measured as the rate of output per
individual worker or per hour. Since net invest-
ment is a measure of the change in the capital
stock, it must be added to the existing stock and
the total must be compared to available labor
resources, if a meaningful assessment of the
contribution of capital formation to income per
worker is to be made.
Since 1979, labor force growth slowed mark-
edly. Such a slowing would imply a rise in the
growth rate of capital per worker and produc-
tivity, unless capital stock growth slowed as
21The constant dollar net nonresidential capital stock
measure is described in U.S. Department of Commerce
(1987). Revisions appear in Musgrave (1988). Quarterly net
capital stock data estimated by this Bank, adjusted for the
capacity utilization rate in manufacturing, and data for
much. From 1979 to 1988, the growth rate of
the civilian labor force has been 1.7 percent,
well below the 2.7 percent growth registered
from 1974 to 1979. The growth of the constant-
dollar net nonresidential fixed capital stock
slowed from a 3.2 percent rate from the begin.
ning of 1974 to the beginning of 1979 to a 2.9
percent rate over the next nine years.2’ Thus,
the capital-labor ratio showed faster growth in
the 1980s.
The capital stock grew about 2.4 percentage
points per year faster than the labor force from
1948 to 1973. In response to the oil price shock
in 1973-74, however, the capital stock’s relative
growth nearly came to a halt, as firms adjusted
to a lower desired proportion of capital pci’
worker.22 Since 1979, relative capital growth
resumed, with capital stock growth averaging
1.2 percentage points faster than the growth of
the labor force, despite the fact that oil and
business sector hours show that the growth of utilized
capital per hour declined from 3.5 percent from IV/1 948 to
lVI1973 to 0.6 percent from IV/1973 to lVf1980, and then




energy prices had risen about as much in
1980-85 as they had in 1974.78.23
Productivity has reflected the renewed
strength of capital formation as well. Output
per hour in the business sector rose at only a
0.5 percent rate from 1973 to 1980, after rising
at a 2.9 percent rate from the end of 1948 to
the end of 1973. From 1980 to 1985, however,
productivity rose at a 1.6 percent rate, more
than three times faster than in the previous
period.24 Productivity growth subsequently
slowed to a 0.4 percent rate from early 1986 to
the fourth quarter of 1988.
CONCLUSION
U.S. domestic investment, especially business
investment, was unusually strong in the 1980s.
The policies adopted early in this decade con-
tributed to a renewal in the growth of both
capital per worker and productivity compared
with their performance in the 1970s. This
strength is surprising, given the unusual slack
in labor markets, the availability of existing
unused capital goods, and the rise in energy
costs that immediately preceded this decade.
While some measures, like the nominal gross
investment share or net investment shares of
GNP, suggest that investment was not unusually
strong in this decade, this perception is incor-
rect. Such a view exploits appearances arising
from a strong decline in the relative price of in-
vestment goods, the business cycle and a sharp
slowing in labor force growth. When these fac-
tors are considered, the strong rise in capital
per worker and productivity, at least until the
effects of the 1986 tax reform set in, are readily
reconciled with a relatively strong performance
of investment.
The differing assessments of investment perfor-
mance in the 1980s are central to correctly
judging past and prospective policies. For exam-
ple, investment performance has deteriorated in
the past two years. Whether this is judged a
continuation of the purported dismal investment
performance of the 1980s or another dramatic
23Evidence for the redistribution of world capital stocks and
productivity toward the United States can be found in
Tatom (1986), and (I987a, b).
24The increase in the constant dollar value of the capital
stock was 19.8 percent from the end of 1980 to the end of
1987, much larger than the 7.1 percent and 12.1 percent
increases in the population and in the civilian labor force,
respectively, for the same period. The current value of the
business capital stock rose 46.1 percent, or by $1.3
example of the influence of tax policy on the
economic environment can affect future policy
choices significantly. Proponents of the first
view want to raise taxes to reduce the budget
deficit, which they view as central to the task
of improving the performance of the U.S.
economy, including investment and productivity.
They deny the direct influence of tax policy on
investment behavior, especially in this decade.
Proponents of the second view emphasize that
such a tax change, despite its budgetary implica-
tions, will perversely affect investment and
productivity.
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